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A Tempered 'Yes' to the 'Exculpatory No' 
Scott D. Pomfret 
What circumstances trigger a person's duty to tell the truth? 
Immanuel Kant claimed without qualification that all circumstances 
require truthtelling, even when speaking the truth injures the 
speaker.1 John Henry Cardinal Newman made exceptions for lies 
that achieved some positive end.2 Hugo Grotius permitted lies to 
adversaries.3 The philosophy of twentieth-century common sense 
largely permits white lies.4 
Perhaps surprisingly, some courts have found that Kant's abso­
lute prohibition of falsehood more accurately characterizes a 
speaker's duty to tell the truth to the federal government under 18 
U.S.C. § 1001 than these other, more relaxed standards.s Accord­
ing to this view, the prohibition on lying has no less force in infor­
mal circumstances, in which the speaker swears no oath and the 
government has no reciprocal duty.6 The statute provides in rele­
vant part: 
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legis­
lative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, 
knowingly and willfully-
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device 
a material fact; 
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement 
or representation; or 
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the 
same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or entry; 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 
both.7 
1. See lMMANuEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies From Benevolent Motives, in 
CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OnmR WoRKS ON nm THEORY OF ETHICS 361, 361-
65 {Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Longmans, Green & Co. 6th ed. 1923) (1873). 
2. See JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, APOLOGIA PRO VITA SuA 308-11 {Martin J. 
Svaglic ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) {1865) (accepting that untruths told for just causes are 
arguably morally pennissible). 
3. See 2 HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS Lmru TRES 618-19 (Francis W. 
Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) {1646). 
4. See SISSELA BoK, LYING 61 {1978) (discussing "post-Watergate" society's acceptance 
of white lies). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1996). 
6. See, e.g., Wiener, 96 F.3d at 40 (noting only two trivial exceptions to the statute's 
reach). 
7. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1976 & Supp. 1997). 
754 
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Prosecutors legitimately employ the provision to punish individ­
uals who supply false information to the government on statutorily 
required reports.8 Accordingly, the federal judiciary has widely ap­
plied section 1001 to punish individuals who gave false statements 
to the General Services Administration,9 the Customs Service,10 the 
FBI,11 and state unemployment agencies.12 
Courts have been reluctant, however, to apply the statute to cer­
tain kinds of false statements given in the context of criminal inves­
tigations.13 This reluctance may stem from the fear that prosecutors 
might use the provision improperly: authorities unable to prove the 
elements of a substantive crime could induce a suspect to spout 
falsehoods in order to charge him with a section 1001 violation,14 or 
they could encourage repetition of false responses in order to 
charge multiple statutory violations.15 These kinds of concerns 
prompted one court to create the exculpatory no exception to sec­
tion 1001.16 
The exculpatory no exception shields from section 1001 liability 
an interrogee's denial of involvement in, or knowledge of, criminal 
activity.17 As the name implies, protected responses must have two 
general characteristics: (i) they must be exculpatory; and (ii) they 
must be limited to words of denial containing no discursive 
misrepresentations.18 
Courts deem a response exculpatory if it conveys false informa­
tion in a situation in which a truthful reply would have incriminated 
8. 31 U.S.C. § 5316, for example, requires travelers who cross U.S. borders with more 
than $10,000 in cash to file a report. Section 1001 punishes falsifying reports of this kind. 
See, e.g., United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1983). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Raether, 940 F. Supp. 1485 (D.S.D. 1996). 
10. See, e.g., United States v. Wydermyer, 51 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 1995). 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1997). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Herring, 916 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that be­
cause state unemployment agencies receive federal funds, false statements made to state offi­
cials are, indirectly, false statements to the federal government). 
13. See Tunothy I. Nicholson, Note, Just Say "No": An Analysis of the "Exculpatory No" 
Doctrine, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 22?, 229-30 (1991) (listing doctrinal devices 
courts use to restrict the apparent breadth of § 1001). 
14. See Giles A. Birch, Note, False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the 
Exculpatory No, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1273, 1278 (1990). Indeed, there are many cases in which 
the court dismisses the government's substantive charge and convicts the defendant only of 
the § 1001 charge. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994). 
15. See United States v. Russo, 699 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (N.D. ill. 1988). 
16. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
a suspect's refusal to provide to an inunigration official evidence of a previous illegal entry 
into the United States constituted an exculpatory denial). 
18. See generally Tun A. Thomas, Annotation, What Statements Fall Within Exculpatory 
Denial Exception to Prohibition Under 18 U.S.C.S. § 1001, Against Knowingly and Wilfully 
Making False Statement Which is Material to Matter Within Jurisdiction of Department or 
Agency of United States, 102 A.L.R. FED. 742 (1991). 
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the interrogee. A question incriminates the interrogee if the truth­
ful answer "would in [itself] support a conviction under a federal 
criminal statute [or] ... would furnish a link in the chain of evi­
dence needed to prosecute the [interrogee]."19 The following sce­
nario represents a clear case of an answer that would itself support 
a conviction: an FBI agent asks a suspect who had received illegal 
income whether he had done so, and the suspect denies receiving 
the illegal income.20 Similarly, truthfully admitting receipt of an 
original tax refund check would not directly incriminate a defend­
ant, but would furnish a link in the chain of evidence necessary to 
convict her of fraudulently seeking a replacement check for the 
original that she claimed never to have received.21 A false denial in 
these circumstances would therefore be exculpatory.22 On the 
other hand, had an agent asked whether the sky were blue, and had 
the suspect denied it, the response would not have qualified for the 
exception because, presumably, a truthful answer would not have 
been incriminating,23 and the denial, therefore, would not have 
been exculpatory.24 
The second characteristic of protected responses is their limita­
tion to words of denial. Although there is less unanimity on this 
issue than on the definition of exculpatory,25 this Note initially 
adopts a broad definition reflective of the majority position.26 A 
denial is a simple statement of negation with regard to involvement 
in, or knowledge of, criminal activity.27 The statement must not in­
clude affirmative misrepresentations.28 Words and phrases like 
19. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (defining the term incriminating 
question) (citations omitted). 
20. Cf. United States v. Patemostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that such a 
statement would support a conviction), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir . 1994). 
21. See United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179 (4th Cir . 1988). 
22. See Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 185. 
23. The danger of incrimination must be "real and appreciable" and not "imaginary and 
unsubstantial." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896). 
24. Cf., e.g., United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the defend­
ant's truthful answer to a customs agent's routine questions would not have incriminated him 
and that he therefore did not qualify for the exception). 
25. Compare United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674 (7th Cir . 1980) (restricting eligible 
responses to the word "no") with United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir . 1974) 
(characterizing a two-page affidavit replete with falsehoods as an exculpatory no), overruled 
by Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1040. No other court has been as generous as the Bush court 
in terms of defining "denial." 
26. See generally Thomas, supra note 18, at 759-61 (listing cases holding that the excep­
tion does not apply to affirmative misrepresentations). 
27. See United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183 (1st Cir. 1975). 
28. Cf. Thomas, supra note 18, at 759-61 (listing cases adopting such a limitation). 
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"No, I did not," "none," or "never" qualify as denials.29 
"[D]evis[ing] an elaborate exculpatory story designed to mislead in­
vestigators," on the other hand, is not a simple denial.3° From these 
two characteristics, it is evident that the exception shields a "very 
limited" class of responses.31 
Following the original articulation of the exculpatory no excep­
tion in 1955,32 the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have adopted it.33 Yet despite the exception's 
forty-two-year pedigree, the Second and Fifth Circuits have in re­
cent years either overturned or ignored their own precedent and 
have rejected the exception.34 These two circuits each justify their 
about-face on the same two bases. First, they deny that the stat­
ute's plain wording, even when augmented by the legislative his­
tory, authorizes an exception for mere exculpatory denials35 - the 
"Plain Language Objection." Second, they reject the idea that re­
spect for the values underlying the Fifth Amendment requires af­
firming the exculpatory no exception - the "Values Objection."36 
This Note contends that the Supreme Court, which has granted 
certiorari,37 should recognize the continued validity of the exculpa­
tory no exception. To reflect more closely the concerns that justify 
the exception, the Court should also reformulate the varied tests 
lower courts have employed to determine whether a defendant may 
invoke the exception.38 Part I asserts that Congress had no inten­
tion of criminalizing mere exculpatory denials, and that the excep­
tion is thus completely consistent with the purposes of the false 
statement statute. Part II argues that punishing exculpatory denials 
may threaten the privilege against self-incrimination. This Part 
29. More discursive responses that are statements of negation but do not contain affirma­
tive misrepresentations present borderline cases. They may also qualify for the exception. 
See infra Part IV (setting out the contours of the test for the exception). 
30. United States v. Mayo, No. 96-4867, 1997 WL 657009, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 22, 1997) 
(per curiam). 
31. See United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1980). 
32. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955). 
33. See United States v. Moser, 18 F.3d 469, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 719 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880-81 
(10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1975). 
34. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996), cert granted sub nom. Brogan 
v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997) (ignoring ruling in favor of the exception in United 
States v. Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490, 513 (D. Conn.), affd., 614F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1979)); United 
States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994) (overruling Patemostro v. United 
States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962)). 
35. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 38; Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1044. 
36. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39; Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1049-50. 
37. See Brogan v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2430 (1997). 
38. For a circuit-by-circuit analysis, see Nicholson, supra note 13, at 232-49. 
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contends, however, that the Supreme Court can avoid an unneces­
sary constitutional determination of this issue by upholding the ex­
ception. Part ill argues that the exculpatory no exception protects 
certain principles of fairness that also underlie the Constitution, and 
that, absent congressional intent to the contrary, respect for these 
principles requires recognition of the exception in interpreting sec­
tion 1001. Part IV urges adoption of a streamlined version of the 
tests courts have used to determine the exception's applicability, a 
version that more clearly captures the fairness concerns articulated 
in Part ill and the legislative intent noted in Part I. 
I: THE PuRPosE OF THE FALSE STATEMENT STATUTE 
This Part argues that in enacting section 1001, Congress evinced 
no intention to criminalize simple false denials when an interrogee 
offers them to exculpate himself in the context of a criminal investi­
gation. Section I.A contends that the exception is consistent with 
the limited statutory scope and purposes described in the legislative 
history.39 It also refutes the Second and Fifth Circuits' claims that 
the statutory history prohibits courts' use of the exception. Section 
I.B counters the Second and Fifth Circuits' Plain Language 
objection. 
A. Congressional Intent and the False Statement Statute 
The exculpatory no exception is consistent with the two pur­
poses of the false statement statute: to protect the government 
from certain deceptive practices by contractors, and to protect the 
government from relying on false information that interferes with 
its functions. As to the first purpose, nondiscursive exculpatory de­
nials are simply not the types of practices against which the statute 
39. This Note will treat the 1934 amendment as providing the relevant current statutory 
language. Compare Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-394, 48 Stat. 996 ("[W]hoever shall 
knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a mate­
rial fact, or make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent statements or representations, 
or make or use or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, 
claim, certificate, affidavit or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or ficti­
tious statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of 
the United States . . .  [shall be punished]. ") with supra text accompanying note 7(quoting 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1976 & Supp. 1997)). See also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 
695, 703-08 {1995) (selecting the 1934 amendment and its legislative history as the appropri­
ate sources of congressional intent for§ 1001); United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 
{1984) (same). The 1948 amendment, Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 683, 
consisted of "housekeeping changes in language which are of no particular significance." 
United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 508 {1955), overruled on other grounds by Hubbard, 
514 U.S. at 715; see also Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39. In 1996, Congress reenacted § 1001 with some 
structural changes and an adjustment to the jurisdictional language to ensure coverage of 
individuals who lied before congressional committees. That change had no effect on the stat­
ute's applicability to statements made before executive branch investigators. See False State­
ments Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, 110 Stat. 3459. 
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offers protection.40 According to the Supreme Court, Congress en­
acted the current statutory language in 1934 "to protect the author­
ized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the 
perversion which might result from the deceptive practices de­
scribed. "41 The deceptive practices to which the Supreme Court re­
ferred were submission of false regulatory reports and false 
documents by contractors to the Public Works Administration.42 
Consistent with that interpretation, the legislative history indicates 
that 
· 
[t]here is nothing [in the United States Criminal Code] which permits 
us to make an investigation and prosecute persons who are engaged 
in the "kick-back" practice. They make false returns, claiming that 
they paid certain amounts to their employees, when they have not 
done so. This bill just amends the law so as to give the Federal Govern­
ment authority to deal with that class of cases. 43 
A simple denial of culpability in the face of incriminating question­
ing - at least in situations in which the speaker did not seek a 
government contract - would not even implicate "that class of 
cases," much less frustrate Congress's purpose in enacting the 
statute. 
The exculpatory no exception is also reasonably consistent with 
the statute's second purpose: to prohibit perversion of, or interfer­
ence with, the legitimate functions of government by, for example, 
inducing action or reliance.44 Because exculpatory denials are re­
sponses to questioning, suspects issue them most often during an 
investigation. In a formulation reflected in the Code of Federal 
Regulations,45 an investigator's function is "to determine whether 
sufficient evidence exists for a person to be charged with a crime."46 
Failure to admit wrongdoing is just a part of that evidence; it is not 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 182-84 (1st Cir. 1975). 
41. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941) (emphasis added). 
42. See Donald D. Oliver, Note, Prosecutions for False Statements to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation - The Uncertain Law, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 763, 766 n.12 (1978). 
43. 78 CoNG. REc. 11270 (1934) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Gilliland, 312 
U.S. 86, 94-5 (1941) ("The report of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate stated that the 
amendment in question had been proposed by the Department of the Interior with the pur­
pose 'of reaching a large number of cases involving the shipment of 'hot' oil where false 
papers are presented in connection therewith."' (quoting S. REP. No. 73-1202, at 1 (1934))). 
44. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 205-6 (D. Md. 1955) (holding that false 
denials of paying bribes were not the types of statements that, inter alia, induced action by 
the FBI investigators, and that such actions were therefore outside the ambit of§ 1001); but 
see Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1044 (rejecting requirement of inducing action or reliance and 
finding "no" to be a statement, though conceding that "that word [statement] may connote 
affirmative, aggressive, or overt declarations"). 
45. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.107 (1997) (describing the mission of the investigative wing of the 
IRS to include developing information regarding the extent of criminal violations and recom­
mending matters for prosecution when appropriate). 
46. Oliver, supra note 42, at 774 (citing United States v. Davey, 155 F. Supp. 175, 178 
(S.D.N.Y. 1957)). 
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equivalent to a substantial perversion of the investigator's func­
tion.47 It does not, for example, prevent the investigator from con­
firming his suspicions elsewhere. The investigator, after all, need 
not arrive at the truth of the issue investigated from the mouth of 
the suspect. 48 
Furthermore, because investigators usually expect a certain 
level of resistance from individuals to whom they pose incriminat­
ing questions,49 the interference with investigation that exculpatory 
denials occasion probably is not significant.so Anticipating an un­
truthful answer, investigators almost certainly tend neither to act 
nor to rely on them.51 Instead, as a matter of course, a competent 
agent would probably seek corroboration.52 Even if an agent pro­
cured an admission rather than an exculpatory denial, after all, he 
would not rely on the admission alone but would seek corroborat­
ing evidence.53 
The Second and Fifth Circuits employ two alternative but ulti­
mately unpersuasive historical readings to support their rejection of 
the exculpatory no exception. They argue, first, that the history of 
amendments to the original version of the false statement statute 
indicates a congressional intent over time to broaden application of 
the statute.54 The argument's proponents assert that each time 
47. Cf. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1997) (describing the relevant general function of the FBI as the 
collection of evidence in cases in which the United States is or may be a party). Because 
even the false denial may be evidence, if only for impeachment purposes, see FED. R. Evm. 
80l(d) (excluding party admissions from the definition of hearsay), "collecting " it from the 
suspect is not a perversion of the FBl's function. 
48. The Department of Justice seems to accept this position in its adoption of a policy 
stating that prosecuting exculpatory denials is "not appropriate, " 9 THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE MANuAL § 9-42.160 (1997-1 Supp.), although it does not always adhere to this pol­
icy. See, e.g., United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996). 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 1988) ("A false denial of 
guilt does not pervert the investigator's basic function . . .  but is merely one of the ordinary 
obstacles confronted in a criminal investigation."). 
50. Cf. Oliver, supra note 42, at 774 ("[A] denial of culpability to the FBI during a crimi­
nal investigation does no more to pervert the Bureau's function than a plea of 'not guilty' at 
trial does to pervert the jury's function. "). 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Ampriester, No. 92-10086, 1993 WL 329495, at *6 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 30, 1993) (holding that there was no perversion of function because false answers are 
expected, will not result in government reliance on their truth, and will not engender subse­
quent wild - and expensive - goose chases); Cogdell, 844 F.2d at 184 ("A trained agent 
cannot be overly surprised when a suspected criminal fails to admit guilt. "). 
52. See, e.g., United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[A] 
competent government investigator will anticipate that the defendant will make exculpatory 
statements . . . .  We presume that a thorough agent would continue vigorous investigation of 
all leads until he personally is satisfied that he has obtained the truth. "). 
53. See FRED E. lNBAU ET AL, CruMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 191-94 (3d 
ed. 1986) (asserting that "seldom, if ever " would an investigation end after securing a confes­
sion without searching for additional evidence). 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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Congress amended the statute, it sought to extend the statute's ap­
plication to a broader class of statements.ss According to these 
courts, the exception is inconsistent with this alleged intent toward 
progressively broader application.s6 
Even if one were to accept the tenuous proposition that courts 
can deduce a univocal congressional intent from examining amend­
ments made periodically over the seventy years prior to enactment 
of the statute's current language, it lends no support to the Second 
and Fifth Circuits' argument. In fact, the Supreme Court's review 
of the statute's evolution actually supports the opposite conclusion: 
that no Congress intended to criminalize false denials.s7 Tracing 
the course of amendments through time is illustrative. The original 
false statement statute enacted in 1863, for example, reached only 
military officers and others who made false statements to the gov­
ernment "for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the 
approval or payment of [a false] claim .... " ss Although subse­
quent Congresses through 1918 codified and recodified the statute 
and changed the penalties, these successive amendments to the 
original statute did not broaden section 1001 's basic character as the 
Second and Fifth Circuits claim. Rather, the statute's basic charac­
ter throughout the period consistently required a purpose to bilk 
the government out of money or property.s9 Exculpatory denials 
generally do not have such a purpose, 60 so through 1918, at least, 
Congress apparently did not intend to criminalize them.61 The sub­
sequent substantive amendment in 1934 that enacted the present 
language, of course, did broaden the statute's reach, 62 but if the 
1934 Congress had intended to change the statute's applicability to 
simple exculpatory denials, its legislative history ought to reflect 
55. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39 (finding that "the long-term trend [of amendments to 
§ 1001] is one of expansion"); Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1048. 
56. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39; Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1048. 
57. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 703-708 (1995) (reciting the history of the 
statutory progenitors of the current false statement statute). 
58. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. 
59. See Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 705-06. 
60. Tue purpose of an exculpatory no is, by definition, to exculpate. See supra notes 18-
31 and accompanying text {defining the two characteristics of the exception). 
61. See United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 201 (D. Md. 1955) (stating, after exhaus­
tive review of the legislative history, that it was clear that defendant's false denials would not 
have been within the scope of the Act prior to 1934). 
62. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text {describing how the 1934 amendment 
expanded the statute's reach). 
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that change.63 In fact, it does not.64 Subsequent amendments in 
1948 and 1996 were largely technical and do not alter the analysis. 65 
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Congress intended no 
such change, and that the false statement statute, despite the 
broader application the 1934 amendment effected, remained inap­
plicable to simple denials of inculpatory activity.66 
In its second alternative historical reading, the Fifth Circuit con­
tends that the intent of Congresses more recent than the one that 
enacted the current language ought to help guide statutory inter­
pretation. 67 The court argues that Congress's failure to codify the 
exculpatory no exception in subsequent years68 reflects tacit con­
gressional disapproval of the exception.69 This argument may be 
dismissed on two grounds. First, as a preliminary matter, the 
Supreme Court has generally condemned the use of subsequent 
Congressional conduct to help guide statutory interpretation.70 
Second, Congress's 1996 reenactment of section 1001 implicitly 
approved the exception. The 1996 Act restructured the statute's 
format but did not change the wording of the principal clauses. It 
also slightly altered the jurisdictional language to make clear that 
the statute applied to certain false statements given before the legis­
lature and judiciary, as well as those made to the executive 
branch.71 These changes merely reflected congressional concern 
63. See United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 821-28 (9th Cir. 1976) (Ferguson, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that if Congress had intended for courts to give § 1001 a 
broad interpretation, the statute's enactment would have generated extensive debate because 
of the potential threat to Fifth Amendment values and ideas of fairness). For a discussion of 
this threat, see infra Parts II & ill. 
64. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (detailing how the legislative history shows 
that Congress intended the amendment to bring into the reach of the statute only a limited 
class of statements that did not include exculpatory denials). 
65. See supra note 39. 
66. For an extremely detailed reading of the statutory history that concludes that Con­
gress wanted to protect the government from actual injuries, and not from all false state­
ments in and of themselves, see Goldfine, 538 F.2d at 821-28 (Ferguson, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
67. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F3d 1040, 1048 n.19 (5th Cir. 1994). 
68. See Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980, H.R. 6915, 96th Cong. § 1742; Criminal 
Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong § 1343; John Poggioli, Judicial Reluctance to 
Enforce the Federal False Statement Statute in Investigatory Situations, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 
515, 518 n.20 (1982) (citing Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong. § 1343 
(a)(l)(A), reprinted in Refonn of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1630, 97th Cong. 544-45 (1981)). 
69. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1048 n.19. 
70. See Ftrestone Ttre & Rubber v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 114 (1989) (citing Bowsher v. 
Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837 n.12 (1983)); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) 
("[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earli�r one. "); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 67 (1988). 
71. See False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, 110 Stat. 3459. 
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with the decision in Hubbard v. United States, 72 which held that the 
statute did not apply to false statements made in judicial proceed­
ings.73 Otherwise, Congress made no changes and stated in the leg­
islative history that it meant to "ensure[] that the scope of section 
1001 is limited [after the amendment], as it was prior to 
Hubbard. "74 At the time of Hubbard, only the Fifth Circuit had 
rejected the exception;7s seven circuits approved of it.76 In this con­
text, the legislative history and the fact of reenactment itself appear 
to approve the prior limit on section 1001's breadth that the excep­
tion then imposed.77 Both this contemporary evidence and the evi­
dence that the 1934 amendment provides indicate that the 
exculpatory no exception is a valid construction of section 1001. 
B. The Plain Language Objection 
Courts that reject the exception argue that it has no foundation 
in the statute's "plain language."78 This Plain Language Objection 
is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the statutory 'language is sim­
ply not as plain as these circuits claim. Second, courts - including 
the Second and Fifth Circuits - regularly permit judicial glosses on 
the same or similar statutes without explicit authorization in the 
language.79 Thus, the fact that the exculpatory no exception is a 
gloss on the language is not sufficient reason to reject it. 
The language of section 1001 is neither plain nor simple: at sev­
eral points it exhibits ambiguities that courts must resolve - and 
lacunae that courts must fill - by going beyond the text.80 The 
statute requires, for example, that the defendant have made the 
statement "knowingly and willfully. "81 While the meaning of the 
72. 514 U. S. 695 (1995). 
73. See H.R. REP. No. 104-680, at 2-6 (1996) (discussing the need to amend § 1001 in 
response to Hubbard's exclusion of judicial proceedings from the statute's scope). 
74. See H.R. REP. No. 104-680 at 2. 
75. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994). 
76. See supra note 33. 
77. In addition, Congress's past failures to codify the exception did not necessarily indi­
cate any particular intent. The exception had not yet been challenged at the times of the 
proposed codifications the FJ.fth Circuit cited, and a change therefore may have seemed un­
necessary. Furthermore, Congress had never amended section 1001 to prevent use of the 
exception, a failure that may as easily indicate tacit approval. See Erica S. Perl, United States 
v. Rodriguez-Rios: The Fifth Circuit Says "Adios!" to the "Exculpatory No" Doctrine, 69 
Tm .. L. REv. 621, 630 (1994). 
78. See, e.g., United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1996). 
79. For example, every court construing the language of § 1001 has limited the statute's 
reach. No court has held that it applies to every possible statement that might arguably be 
construed as "false." See Oliver, supra note 42, at 763. 
80. See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he language ... of § 1001 can provide 'no more than a guess as to what Congress in­
tended."' (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958))). 
81. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) (West 1976 & Supp. 1997) (emphasis added). 
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term "willfully" is not always clear,82 the Supreme Court has inter­
preted it in other contexts to require that the defendant intended to 
violate a known law.83 Lower courts have not gone so far in the 
context of section 1001, but some have held that "willfully" means 
"deliberately and with knowledge"84 or, alternatively, with an evil 
motive.85 Adopting these definitions would mean that a denial 
made out of surprise or a denial given with a good motive, such as 
to avoid incriminating oneself, would not be punishable under sec­
tion 1001.86 It is beyond the scope of this Note to argue that the 
Supreme Court ought to adopt a particular definition of "willfully" 
in the context of section 1001. The point is that the definition is not 
obvious and that some definitions - but not others - would put 
exculpatory denials outside the scope of the statute. This ambiguity 
refutes the Plain Language Objection. 
Similarly, the meaning of the statutory term "statement,"87 for 
example, is not "plain": it may encompass any oral or verbal utter­
ance, 88 or it may refer to a more limited subset of utterances.89 The 
Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, use the term in a limited 
way: a person must intend an utterance as an assertion for it to 
82. See Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943) ("[W]illful • . .  is a word of many 
meanings, its construction often being influenced by its context."). 
83. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (holding that willfulness in 
the context of the antistructuring provisions of the cash transaction reporting requirements 
included knowledge of the duty not to structure such transactions); Cheek v. United States, 
498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) ("Wtllfulness . . .  requires the Government to prove that the law 
imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he volunta­
rily and intentionally violated that duty."). 
84. See e.g., United States v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1992). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Weiler, 385 F.2d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1967). 
86. See United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a 
simple exculpatory denial does not give sufficient indication of being knowing and willful 
enough to meet the mens rea requirement of § 1001). 
87. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 1976 & Supp. 1997). 
88. See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1128 (1980) (defining the word as a 
"declaration or remark: assertion"). 
89. Cf. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding, in the 
context of the federal statute prohibiting interstate communications containing a threat, that 
the term "threat" had implicit limitations that begged for a narrow construction, despite be­
ing modified by the term "any"). The legislative history of the 1934 amendment to the false 
statement statute provides evidence of a more restrictive definition of statement. President 
Franklin Roosevelt vetoed the first attempt by Congress to reach the "hot oil" cases, see 
supra note 43, because he thought the penalty was not severe enough. See 78 CoNo. REc. 
6778-79 (1934). The legislative history of that first attempt clearly indicates that the Senators 
assumed that the word "statement" referred to statements on required reports to New Deal 
agencies. See, e.g., 78 CoNG. REc. 3724 (1934) ("We just took the statute as it now is and 
tried to make it applicable to the new operations of the Government." (emphasis added)); 78 
CoNG. REc. 2858-59 (1934) (asserting that the broad language was intended to reach all the 
"buzzards": "grafters, place hunters, [lobbyists and favor seekers] who [we]re trying to ex­
tract money illegally" by submitting false certificates and fictitious bids while transacting 
business with various agencies of the Department of the Interior). The successful 1934 
amendment to the false statement statute shows no indication that the Senators had any 
broader understanding of the term "statement." See, e.g., 78 CoNG. REc. 11,270-71 (1934). 
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qualify as a "statement."90 Even in rejecting the exculpatory no ex­
ception, the Fifth Circuit concedes in Rodriguez-Rios that "that 
word [statement] may connote [only] affirmative, aggressive, or 
overt declarations."91 Consistent with these definitions, some 
courts have regarded a simple denial of culpability as nonassertive 
and therefore not a statement for the purposes of the statute.9 2 
The statutory term "false" is also not as plain as it might appear 
initially. Certain declarations, such as excited utterances, can be 
neither true nor false. A "no" may be an exclamation or "excited 
utterance,"93 if the accusative questioning is sufficiently startling, 
unexpected, or intense.94 If the investigator, for example, browbeat 
and provoked a suspect to such an extent that the suspect angrily 
snapped "no" to get the investigator off his back, such a denial may 
be neither true nor false.95 In fact, it may not even be a "state­
ment" because of its nonassertive nature. As this section indicates, 
Congress's intent for meanings of the terms "willfully," "false," and 
"statement" is simply not so plain as the Second and Fifth Circuits 
have claimed.96 
Even if the plain language had unambiguously authorized appli­
cation of the statute to any utterance arguably deserving of the la­
bel "false" in any setting whatsoever, it is simply untrue that courts 
do not go beyond the plain language in making their decisions.97 In 
fact, broad statutory language may represent a delegation of power 
from Congress to the courts. Thus, broad language may not require 
broad application, but may instead represent a license to create fed­
eral common law.98 The Sherman Act provides an example. 
Courts have construed the words "[e]very contract ... in restraint 
of trade"99 not to prohibit literally any contract - because all con-
90. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining statement in the hearsay context as an "assertion 
or ... conduct . . .  intended .. . as an assertion"). 
91. United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1994). 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206 (D. Md. 1955). 
93. Cf. FED. R. Evm. 803(2) (excited utterance as hearsay exception). 
94. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 933 F. 2d 1313, 1319 (6th Cir. 1991) (implicitly sug­
gesting that "spontaneous, emotional disclaimers uttered by a suspect" might not be state­
ments for the purposes of § 1001). 
95. The denial may be a response to the manner of questioning, rather than to the con­
tent of the questions. 
96. See Steele, 933 F.2d at 1323-34 (Brown, J., dissenting) ("[Even t]he majority opinion 
. • .  recognizes that the meaning of section 1001, on its face, is not so plain."). 
97. See United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 362 (1926) ("[G]eneral terms ... may and 
should be limited where the literal application of the statute would lead to extreme or absurd 
results, and where the legislative purpose gathered from the whole Act would be satisfied by 
a more limited interpretation."); cf. United States v. Bedore, 455 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 
1972) (describing the absurdity that would result from a very broad application of§ 1001). 
98. See Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. Cr. REv. 
345, 367-70. 
99. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1994). 
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tracts restrain trade in some way - but only contracts that unrea­
sonably restrain trade.100 To construe such a broad statute 
otherwise would be to impute to Congress an intent it could not 
possibly have had: to ban the practice of making contracts.101 
The same logic justifies restricting the scope of section 1001. 
The strictest reading of the plain language, after all, could yield an 
interpretation that encompassed just about any statement in any 
circumstance whatsoever.102 Nevertheless, every court, including 
the Second and Fifth Circuits, has limited the broad reading in 
some fashion. Indeed, the circuits' limitations on section 1001 have 
no more support from the plain language or legislative history than 
the exculpatory no exception.103 This inconsistency demonstrates 
that the Second and Fifth Circuits object not to narrowing the statu­
tory scope that section 100l's plain language dictates, but to the 
method of the narrowing. If the Plain Language Objection were 
viable, it would 'also preclude the interpretations these circuits ac­
cept. The objection is therefore merely an interpretive make­
weight. 
In sum, this Part has demonstrated that the exculpatory no ex­
ception is a valid construction of the false statement statute because 
it is consistent with the statute's two purposes. Moreover, the Plain 
Language Objection is insufficient to cast doubt on the exception's 
validity. 
100. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
101. See National Socy. of Profl. Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978) ("One 
problem presented by the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act is that it cannot mean what it 
says."). 
102. See Bedore, 455 F.2d at 1110 ("If . . .  section 1001 were read literally, virtually any 
false statement, sworn or unsworn, written or oral, made to a Government employee could 
be penalized as a felony."). 
103. Notwithstanding their Plain Language Objection, these circuits implicitly accepted 
two extratextual judicial glosses on the statute's then·existing plain language that are indistin­
guishable on a principled basis from the exculpatory no exception. Strictly speaking, the 
phrase "knowingly and willfully, " for example, modified only "falsifies, conceals or covers up 
by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact." 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). The other two 
phrases - regarding false statements and false writings - were unmodified, suggesting that 
no culpability requirement applies to them. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit did require that 
each of the types of conduct be done "knowingly and willfully." See United States v. 
Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit explicitly noted that 
this requirement was only one of the safeguards "embodied " in - rather than evident from a 
strict reading of the plain language of - the statute. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 
40 (2d Cir. 1996). 
Similarly, application of the "materiality " requirement to all three types of conduct in the 
pre-1996 version of the statute is also a judicial construction, a "judge-made limitation, " see 
United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1980), like the exculpatory no exception, 
that goes beyond the plain or literal meaning. See United Sates v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 524 
(1995) (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring) ("Whether 'material· 
ity' is indeed an element of every offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is not at all obvious from its 
text."). 
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II. COERCION, CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING, AND THE 
v ALUES OBJECTION 
The exculpatory no exception permits the Supreme Court to 
avoid deciding whether applying the federal false statement statute 
to mere exculpatory denials violates the privilege against self­
incrimination.104 When a statutory construction obviates the need 
for a constitutional decision, and that construction does not frus­
trate congressional intent,105 the Court's precedent requires it to ac­
cept the construction and refuse to reach the constitutional 
question.1°6 The relevance of the Self-Incrimination Clause107 has 
been the subject of significant conflict among the courts.108 In re­
sponse to the Second and Fifth Circuits' Values Objection, which 
holds the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to the prosecution of ex­
culpatory denials under the federal false statement statute,109 this 
Part sketches the prima facie argument, elaborated at length else­
where,110 that the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause 
does implicitly prohibit punishing simple exculpatory denials.111 
Specifically, it argues that punishing exculpatory denials creates for 
the interrogee a coercive "cruel trilemma"112 that is analogous to 
that faced by a courtroom witness absent the protections of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause.113 The Part goes on to argue that the 
exculpatory no exception is a statutory construction that permits 
the Court to avoid having to resolve whether the Self-Incrimination 
104. Courts commonly justify the exculpatory no exception by making reference to the 
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 715 F. 
Supp. 242, 243 ( S. D. Ind. 1989). 
105. See supra Part I (arguing that the exception does not frustrate congressional intent). 
106. See NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1964) (declining to apply a statute 
broadly in a case in which a ban "might" collide with First Amendment rights); see also 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (citing supporting cases dating back to the tenure of Chief Justice John 
Marshall). 
107. See U.S. CoNST. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself .... ") 
108. Compare Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1049 (rejecting the relevance of the Self­
Incrimination Clause) with United States v. Russo, 699 F. Supp. 1344, 1346-47 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
(identifying encroachment on a defendant's rights against self-incrimination as a justification 
for the exception). 
109. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1996); Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 
1049. 
110. See generally Richard E. Tnnbie, Note, Constitutionally Privileged False Statements, 
22 STAN. L. REv. 783 (1970). 
111. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("[T)he Fifth Amendment privi­
lege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all 
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way .... " (emphasis 
added)). 
112. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
113. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. 
768 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:754 
Clause protects such denials. For this reason, the Court should 
adopt it. 
The options open to a suspect of federal agents are quite compa­
rable to those options the Court has ruled unacceptable for a court­
room witness under the Self-Incrimination Clause. 1 1 4  Without the 
Fifth Amendment's protections, the courtroom witness would face 
prosecution for perjury for a lie, contempt for silence, or conviction 
for an incriminating admission. This scenario creates a "cruel 
trilemma"1 1s and is constitutionally prohibited. 1 1 6  Similarly, with­
out the exculpatory no exception's protection, the suspect would 
have to choose from a false denial, a self-incriminating truth, or si­
lence - each of which entails adverse consequences. He could 
confess his wrongdoing, which could result in conviction on the ba­
sis of the confession. He could deny the conduct, so that a court 
might subsequently convict him of a false statement. Or the inter­
rogee could attempt to remain silent. 1 17 Aside from the fact that 
silence may not be a practical option because the interrogee may be 
unaware of his right to silence, 1 1 8  or because "communicative reali­
ties" prohibit silence and require some answer, 1 1 9  federal prosecu­
tors may subsequently use silence as evidence to convict the 
interrogee. 1 2 0  In each of these cases, a defendant "will have been 
convicted by his own words [or silence] given to an investigating 
114. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. 
115. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. 
116. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55. 
117. But see Nedra D. Campbell & Anne Gallagher, Eleventh Survey of White Collar 
Crime: False Statements, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 679, 683 n.25 (1996) (reporting cases in which 
courts characterize silence as misleading and punish it under § 1001). 
118. Indeed, absent the oath, Miranda warnings, transcript and other formal trappings 
that indicate legal rights are at stake, the interrogee may not realize he has, and may invoke, 
a present legal right not to answer questions in an informal interview. Cf. United States v. 
Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1976) (noting some of the circumstances that prompted 
the court to describe the defendant's response as an exculpatory no, including lack of oath or 
transcript and informal, oral nature of the questioning). Without formal cues, the interrogee 
seems unlikely to be thinking in the language of rights. See Oliver, supra note 42, at 775. 
119. See United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 821 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976) (Ferguson, J,, 
concurring and dissenting) (noting that "communicative realities" make "standing mute in 
the face of question[ing] . • .  exceedingly unnatural . • •  and . . •  unwholesome"). If investiga­
tors in fact construe silence as guilt in this way, they effectively "wring an admission of guilt 
from the accused's very decision to stand aside from the process." Robert S. Gerstein, The 
Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. 
REv. 343, 352 (1979). In a situation requiring some response, the denial may function as a 
proxy for silence, a "filler" phrase, or it may be a performative, a refusal to participate in the 
interrogation, rather than a substantive response to the incriminating question. See DAVID 
NYBERG, THE VARNISHED TRUTH: TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN ORDINARY LIFE 179 
(1993) (noting that when it is not possible to tell an intruder to mind his own business, a lie 
may be an appropriate defense of privacy (quoting J.L. MACKIE, Enucs: lNvENTING RIGHT 
AND WRONG 182 (1977))). 
120. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) (holding that evidence of a wit­
ness's silence before receiving the Miranda warnings may be used to impeach the witness). 
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officer of the United States government, who at the time suspected 
[the defendant] of unlawful activity."121 Posing questions to which 
an affirmative truthful answer would incriminate the suspected in­
terrogee is, therefore, coercive and arguably prohibited by the Fifth 
Amendment.122 
In rejecting the exculpatory no exception, the Second and Frfth 
Circuits argued that the Fifth Amendment provides a right to si­
lence rather than a right to lie,123 and therefore does not protect 
false denials.124 The argument has three flaws. First, the Supreme 
Court case that the circuit courts quote simply does not involve a 
challenge under the Self-Incrimination Clause and is therefore in­
apposite.125 Second, the argument assumes that the interrogee in 
an informal interview perceives silence as an option that is open to 
him; in fact, many times it is not.126 A suspect's refusal to answer 
on the grounds that it may incriminate him, for example, prompts 
the unmistakable inference that the suspect is guilty of a crime re­
lated to the question asked and is, therefore, as inculpatory as an 
admission.121 In this situation, silence would be the functional 
equivalent of an admission because it had the same effect.128 Fur­
thermore, in contrast to a formal interview preceded by oaths, 
Miranda warnings, transcripts, and other trappings of formality that 
indicate a setting in which it is appropriate for the interrogee to 
invoke legal rights, the informal interview provides no such cues.129 
The third flaw in the Second and Fifth Circuits' focus on the 
"right to silence" is that their analysis is incomplete - it does not 
exhaust the content of the Fifth Amendment.130 It fails to speak to 
121. United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 818 (5th Cir. 1974). 
122. See United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1321 n.7 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating in dicta 
that where an interrogee is the suspect of the investigation, such circumstances implicate 
Filth Amendment values (citing United States v. Alzate-Restreppo, 890 F.2d 1061, 1069-70 
(9th Cir. 1989) (Patel and Nelson, JJ., concurring in the judgment))). 
123. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Bryson v. United 
States, 396 U.S. 64, 72 (1969)); United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040, 1049-50 (5th 
Cir. 1994). 
124. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39; Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F3d at 1049-50. 
125. See Bryson, 396 U.S. at 72 (rejecting challenge on due process grounds), cited in 
Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d at 1049-50. The Wiener court viewed favorably the Rodriguez-Rios 
court's interpretation of Bryson. See Wiener, 96 F.3d at 39 (citing with approval Rodriguez­
Rios, 14 F.3d 1049-50). 
126. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
127. See Tunbie, supra note 110, at 790. 
128. See NYBERG, supra note 119, at 179-80 ("Saying nothing may well be no real option: 
to give no answer to a question may well be, by implication, to give one answer rather than 
another . . . .  " (quoting J.L. MACKIE, Ennes: lNvENTING R!Glfl" AND WRONG 182 (1977))). 
129. See supra note 118. 
130. Indeed, the primary case cited by the Second and Filth Circuits to support their 
focus on silence explicitly notes that coercion would alter the analysis. See Bryson, 396 U.S. 
at 69-70 (noting that a claim of duress, inter alia, would have altered analysis of the lie). 
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the line of Fifth Amendment cases that emphasize the word "com­
pelled" rather than the "right to silence."131 Under this line of 
cases, the Self-Incrimination Clause protects individuals from im­
proper methods of interrogation.132 From this perspective, it makes 
no difference whether "no" is a statement, or whether the response 
is a lie, or a truth, or silence.133 The response, in effect, is not im­
portant. What matters is whether the method of interrogation 
amounted to governmental compulsion.134 Mere exculpatory deni­
als should not be punished under section 1001 because they prevent 
cruel trilemmas that compel self-incrimination.13s 
When a given application of a statue would "raise serious consti­
tutional problems,"136 courts should seek a construction that avoids 
the constitutional issue, unless Congress expressly intended to con­
front it.137 In the case of the false statement statute, Congress 
showed no such express intent.138 The Court therefore should ap-
131. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to 
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. R:Ev. 2625 (1996) (arguing the existence of two readings of the 
Fifth Amendment, based respectively on a privilege against self-incrimination and on a right 
not to be subjected to compulsion). Professor Alschuler provides a long list of historical 
materials suggesting that the framers of the Constitution intended only the latter. See id. at 
2647-60. 
132. See id. at 2626. 
133. See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & 
MARY L. R:Ev. 15, 32 (1981) ("That right [to silence] is not a right to be thought innocent or a 
right to escape harmful consequences, but is a right not to help bring about those 
consequences."). 
134. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986), cited in Alschuler, supra note 
131, at 2626. In the case currently pending before the Supreme Court, Brogan v. United 
States, the investigating agents - who already had independent evidence of the defendant's 
wrongdoing - sprung a surprise interrogation on him, pressured him to cooperate, which he 
apparently refused to do, and then directly inquired whether the defendant had committed 
the wrongful acts. Brogan merely responded "no." Unable to secure a conviction on one of 
the two substantive charges, the government also charged him under § 1001 for his simple 
denial. See United States v. Wiener, 96 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1996); Brief for Petitioner at *2-3 
& n.1, Brogan v. United States, No. 96-1579, 1997 WL 523874 (filed August 21, 1997); cf. 
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) (characterizing a situation in which several po­
lice officers questioned a suspect in his bedroom in the early morning as creating a potential 
for compulsion equivalent to a police station interrogation). 
135. See Tnnbie, supra note 110, at 783 (arguing that the Fifth Amendment protects ex­
culpatory denials from prosecution under the false statement statute). While the Supreme 
Court has ruled that statements in general, given in a noncustodial interview, may be used 
against the speaker, see Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976), the Court has 
not ruled on using mere exculpatory denials against the speaker, or for that matter, whether a 
mere exculpatory denial constitutes a "statement" within the meaning of the Beckwith 
decision. 
136. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 'Ifades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
137. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) (refusing to 
"conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous constitutional thickets in the 
absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils"); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. 
at 575; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 & n.30 (1932). 
138. Cf. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 76-77, 82-83 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dis­
senting) ("[T]he language and legislative history of § 1001 can provide 'no more than a guess 
December 1997] Note - Exculpatory No 771 
prove the exculpatory no exception to neutralize the potential con­
stitutional threat this Part has illustrated. 
ill. PROTECTING INTERESTS IN FAIRNESS AND 
THE v ALUES OBJECTION 
Beginning from the assumption that courts ought to139 - and 
often do140 -- construe the law against a moral background of fair­
ness and equity, this Part contends that the Supreme Court, in 
keeping with its decisions regarding its supervisory power over 
criminal law enforcement,141 should retain the exculpatory no ex­
ception because it protects fairness. It should do so not on constitu­
tional grounds, but because "courts' whole approach to 
nonconstitutional review is properly informed by conceptions of le­
gitimate public purpose that underlie substantive constitutional 
scrutiny."142 Absent congressional intent to the contrary,143 the 
Court may assume that Congress legislated against the background 
of such "conceptions of legitimate public purpose" as ensuring fair­
ness.144 Informed by this assumption, the Court ought to adopt the 
exception as consistent with the values underlying the Constitution 
and with the purposes of the false statement statute.145 This argu-
as to what Congress intended.' . . .  [T]he legislative history simply 'fails to evidence congres­
sional awareness of the statute's claimed scope.'" (citations omitted)). 
139. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 16-17 (1985) (describing a 
model of adjudication in which judges decide hard cases against a background of moral val­
ues, provided, however, that these background principles do not conflict with other principles 
that must be presupposed to justify the law, or scheme of laws, they are enforcing). 
140. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1944) (permitting disregard of 
the legal form of the corporation to avoid an inequitable result); United States Fidelity and 
Guar. Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 620 F. Supp. 361, 369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reaching a 
result "not expressly sanctioned" by the Uniform Commercial Code in order to avoid an 
"unjust" and "inequitable" outcome), affd., 786 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986); Henningsen v. Bloom­
field Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 85 (NJ. 1960) (abandoning the old warranty-based products 
liability regime in favor of a form of enterprise liability in part because "[a]n instinctively felt 
sense of justice crie[d] out" against the result otherwise obtaining). 
141. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (avoiding a decision on con­
stitutional grounds and pointing out that while review of state criminal law is limited to en­
forcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standards of federal criminal justice "are not 
satisfied merely by observance of [the] minimal historic safeguards" of due process); see also 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1957) (holding federal criminal law officers to 
a standard more stringent than due process required). 
142. GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 153 (1991); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1018 (1989). 
143. See Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun­
cil, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
144. See ROBINSON, supra note 142, at 153; cf. Eskridge, supra note 142, at 1020 ("The 
Court should assume that Congress is sensitive to constitutional concerns . . .  .''). 
145. For a discussion of the fairness interests protected by the Fifth Amendment, see, for 
example, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Gerstein, supra note 119, at 345-52 
(discussing moral autonomy and other justifications for the privilege). Similarly, courts have 
often hinted that fairness prompts the impulse to recognize the exculpatory no exception. 
See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 133 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Colo. 1953). 
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ment, then, is an alternative response to the Second and Fifth Cir­
cuits' Values Objection. 
Borrowing the phraseology of John Rawls,1 4 6  this Part articu­
lates four such concepts of fairness. Sections III.A through III.D 
define fairness as, respectively, procedural proportionality,1 4 7 
human dignity,1 4s fair play,1 49 and notice.1 5o Each section then 
identifies the· legal analogue suggesting that a particular defined 
value underlies the terms of the Constitution. Without addressing 
the merits of the fairness claims, which are treated at length in the 
cited sources, these sections instead sketch how the exculpatory no 
exception vindicates these fairness interests. It also asserts that the 
parallels between the fairness interests protected by the Constitu­
tion and those protected by the exception ought to militate in favor 
of sustaining the exception. 
A. Fairness as Procedural Proportionality 
In the section 1001 context, the principle of procedural propor­
tionality1 51 requires courts to balance the public's interest in the or­
derly functioning of government against the individual's interest in 
freedom from government interference.1 5 2  A constitutional ana­
logue lies in the Court's search and seizure decisions requiring some 
parity between the government's needs and the extent of its inva­
sion.1 5 3  Similarly, if the government is unlikely to rely on the an­
swer to an incriminating question, its need for a truthful reply may 
diminish relative to the interrogee's right to be let alone.1 5 4  The 
146. Cf. JoHN RAwr.s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-17 (1971) (describing the propriety of 
the label "justice as fairness"). 
147. See discussion infra section III.A. 
148. See generally JosEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND um LAW 38-46 (1993). 
149. See generally William J. Schwartz, Note, Fairness in Criminal Investigations Under 
the Federal False Statement Statute, 11 CoLUM. L. REv. 316, 325 (1977) (noting that the excul­
patory no exception guards against, inter alia, prosecutorial overreaching). 
150. See generally Oliver, supra note 42, at 775-777 (referring to notice as procedural 
safeguards). 
151. See Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 41 (arguing that, with the exception of very seri­
ous crimes like murder, police should generally leave potential suspects alone unless the po· 
lice have a substantial basis for suspicion). Implicitly, Greenawalt is contending that the 
harm done must justify the invasion of the right to be left alone. 
152. See, e.g., United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988). 
153. Cf. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967) (holding that the quan­
tum of probable cause required for issuance of an inspection warrant must be determined in 
part by the reasonableness of the search: reasonableness requires "balancing the need to 
search against the invasion which the search entails"). 
154. In theory, for example, the public is less apt to feel resentment in situations in which 
there is no harm. See Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 
5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 237, 267 (1994). Where the public feels no resentment, there is 
arguably less of a likelihood that the public will want to authorize such government intru· 
sions. See id. at 268. 
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Department of Justice appears to concede this view.155 In such a 
case, therefore, permitting a minimally harmful156 exculpatory de­
nial that frees an interrogee from his coercive predicament seems to 
strike an appropriate balance.157 The exception helps ensure that 
the government's investigation is procedurally proportional by cre­
ating a zone of noninterference where governmental interests are 
minimal, much as the privilege against self-incrimination secures a 
preserve against government intrusion. 
B. Fairness As Human Dignity 
Application of the false statement statute to simple exculpatory 
denials can violate the principle of fairness as human dignity by 
making an individual the instrument of his own destruction.158 A 
violation of this principle is a particularized form of governmental 
interference for which the Supreme Court has previously shown 
concern through its solicitude, in the context of the Fifth Amend­
ment, for "the inviolability of the human personality."159 Issuing an 
exculpatory denial can be an assertion of human dignity, an "affir­
mation of self in the face of the state"160 similar to the ethical basis 
for the requirements of various provisions of the Bill of Rights,161 
because it serves the function of self-preservation. Morally, there is 
intrinsic value in giving the accused the capacity to defend himself 
with an exculpatory denial rather than having the government look 
after his liberty .162 
This fairness interest also accords with common intuition. Com­
mentators argue, for example, that self-preservation is - at best ­
a laudable instinct163 and, even at worst, an understandable one. 
The squeamishness about punishing the instinct, for example, may 
155. Cf. 9 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANuAL, supra note 48, § 9-42.160 (stating 
policy "that it is not appropriate to charge a Section 1001 violation where a suspect, during an 
investigation, merely denies his guilt"). Such a policy implies that obtaining the truth from 
the suspect in these limited circumstances is not so valuable to the government that it out­
weighs other concerns. 
156. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of why a mere "no" 
causes little or no harm. 
157. See Cogdel� 844 F.2d at 184-85. 
158. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN EnnCAL STUDY 194 (1988) 
("[M]aking me the active instrument of my own destruction signals the entire subordination 
of the self to the state."). 
159. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
160. LUBAN, supra note 158, at 195. 
161. See id.; see also Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 49-50 (outlining the argument for the 
symbolic significance of the right to silence). 
162. See Gerstein, supra note 119, at 351 ("[T]he self-respect of an autonomous person 
rests in part on his capacity to protect his own interests through the assertion of his rights."). 
163. See JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CruMINAL LAW 208 (1995) (citing 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *186 for the proposition that self-preservation is a 
"great universal principle."); Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 29. 
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be a "There-but-for-the-grace-of-God-go-I" empathy.164 Each of us 
is unsure that he would act differently if faced with the situation, 
and fairness thus requires that society not hold particular individu­
als to norms more strict than its individual members believe they 
can meet.165 
C. Fairness as Fair Play 
By providing the suspect with the safe harbor of an exculpatory 
denial, the exception helps to level the playing field between a rela­
tively weak criminal suspect and a powerful government together 
engaged in an adversarial contest.166 The Court's decisions in Mi­
randa v. Arizona167 and other cases168 reflect one constitutional an­
alogue of this type of fairness. Instead of permitting the already 
strong state to exploit the suspect by compelling him to incriminate 
himself, the Self-Incrimination Clause forces the state to "maintain 
a 'fair state-individual balance' "169 and to " 'shoulder the entire 
load' "170 of proving that individual guilty.111 A second analogue is 
the Supreme Court's due process vagueness doctrine that aims in 
part at "eliminating laws that invite [government] manipulation."172 
Similarly, the exculpatory no exception discourages the government 
not only from enlisting the suspect in his own destruction, but also 
from engaging in misconduct involving the very real danger of 
164. Cf. J.R LuCAs, ON JUSTICE 212 (1980) ("Human beings . • •  are not so separate as 
liberal theorists have commonly supposed. They share, to some limited extent, a common 
rationality and some common values."). 
165. See William J. Stuntz, Self Incrimination and Excuse, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1242· 
61 (1988); cf. MoDEL PENAL CooE, § 2.09 cmt. at 374-75 (1985) (construing duress as encom­
passing those unfair choices where "judges are not prepared to affirm that they . . .  could 
comply with [the law] if their turn to face the problem should arise"). 
166. See generally GRANO, supra note 148, at 28-32 (describing the similar "fox-hunter's 
argument" that even a guilty defendant deserves a sporting chance to prevent his trial from 
becoming a meaningless exercise and to encourage the government to conduct a thorough 
investigation). 
167. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
168. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1984) ("[T]actics for eliciting inculpa· 
tory statements must fall within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Four­
teenth Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness."). 
169. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (quoting 8 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS 
AT CoMMON LAW § 2251(12) (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
170. Murphy v. Waterfront Commn. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (quoting 8 JoHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT CoMMON LAw § 2251(12) (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
171. Silence, of course, could have the.same effect, but often the suspect does not per­
ceive silence as an option, see supra note 118, or silence does not adequately protect the 
interrogee's interests. See Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 30. 
172. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Stat· 
utes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 197 & n.21 (1985) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156 (1972)). 
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abuse of section 1001.173 Such abuse might take the form, for ex­
ample, of the government's asking questions to which it already 
knows the answer in order to invite repetition of what it knows to 
be false statements for the purpose of multiplying the counts.114 
Even absent the abuse, the exculpatory denial may help to ensure 
fair play between investigator and suspect: it offers a suspect a lim­
ited exception from his duty of truthtelling in a situation in which 
the government agent has no equivalent duty.11s 
D. Fairness as Notice 
The exculpatory no exception protects individuals who had no 
notice176 that a false denial of guilt is legally wrong.117 The 
Supreme Court has held that due process requires notice to poten­
tial wrongdoers when ordinary conduct constitutes criminal behav­
ior.178 Without such protection, the government could punish a 
173. Cf. Robert B. F!Ske, Jr., White Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. 
REv. 169, 280 (1980) ("Because section 1001 . . .  combines lenient standards of proof with 
relatively high penalties, it has the potential for abuse."). 
174. See United States v. Russo, 699 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (N.D. ill. 1988). 
175. The Supreme Court has endorsed many deceptive police practices in the course of 
investigation. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (approving agent's use of 
false story to gain access to and record a criminal bribery conspiracy). 
176. This account of notice presupposes a challenge to the liberal positivist position that 
mistake of law is not a permissible defense because it provides incentives for people to con,­
sult and know the intricacies of the criminal code. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 
1069 (N.Y. 1987). Under this challenged conception, any rule is fair with regard to notice, 
provided the rule is published. See OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 39-
40 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Back Bay Books 1963) (1881). Commentators have widely 
criticized the liberal positivist position, which, according to one commentator, "cannot with­
stand modem analysis." DRESSLER, supra note 163, at 148 & 147 n.1 (citing commentators 
criticizing the positivist view). For an extended critique of this liberal positivist position and 
a general description of the legal moralist concept of notice that this Note employs, see Dan 
M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse - but Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REv. 
127, 145-49 (1997) (analyzing, inter alia, the Supreme Court's implicit reasoning in Cheek v. 
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991)). 
177. For example, many government forms and declarations - including tax returns -
include warnings above the signature line that falsehoods are punishable as perjury. A rea­
sonable but uninformed citizen may infer that absent such a warning, falsehoods are not 
punishable - in other words, that it is the breaking of an oath, and not the failure to tell the 
truth, that warrants punishment. Cf. United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 
1975) (noting the informality of the questioning, including the lack of an oath, as a factor that 
induced the court to declare the denials in question to be "clear" exculpatory no's). 
178. See Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 
(1957); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 427 (1985) (absent congressional 
intent to do otherwise, construing a criminal statute as including a "knowledge-of illegality 
requirement" where the statute punished ordinary behavior that a defendant would not nor­
mally consider to be unlawful). The "willful" element of § 1001 also arguably requires "the 
specific intent to do something the law forbids." 9 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANuAL 
§ 9-42.142(B) (1989-2 Supp.). 
776 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:754 
person who lacked opportunity to conform his conduct to the re­
quirements of the law. 1 79 
Notice is particularly important when the ordinary conduct pro­
hibited falls on the moral boundary line between what is socially 
desirable or tolerated 1 8 0 and what is socially undesirable,1 81 Self­
protective denials in the face of government interrogation are in­
stances of such morally ambiguous acts. 1 8 2 The ambiguity of these 
denials stems from the clash of two moral imperatives: first, not to 
lie; and second, to protect oneself from an adversary. While the 
first imperative is strong in the Western tradition, 1 8 3 it is not abso­
lute.184 Indeed, this imperative is qualified by the common moral 
intuition that one has no duty to tell the truth to an adversary,1 8 5 
because neither side expects truth from the other. 1 8 6 In an interro­
gation, the government has opened an adversarial relationship1 8 7 
and has consequently relaxed the moral imperative not to lie.1 8 8  
In such cases of moral ambiguity, fair notice requires actual 
knowledge that the conduct is wrong,1 89 and the Court will there-
179. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM 72 (University of Chicago Press 
1956) (1944) ("[G]overnment [under Rule of Law] . . .  is bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand - rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority 
will use its coercive powers . . . and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this 
knowledge."). 
180. Cf. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426 (construing a criminal statute that punished unauthor­
ized transfer of food stamps to have a "knowledge-of-illegality requirement" to avoid punish­
ing "apparently innocent conduct"). For a similar distinction, see also Kahan, supra note 176, 
at 148 (noting the difference between withholding punishment for conduct and approval of 
that conduct). 
181. See Kahan, supra note 176, at 150-51. Professor Kahan notes that in such mere ma­
/um prohibitum crimes, particularly those involving ordinary conduct, see supra notes 164-65 
(describing society's discomfort in holding others to a standard, under criminal law, that is 
higher than the average person could expect to meet), a defense of mistake of law may be 
available; he contrasts this to ma/um in se crimes, in which no mistake-of-law defense is 
available because behavior at the margins of legality indicates the bad character society 
wants to punish. 
182. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4 (detailing ambiguity of the scope of one's 
duty to tell the truth). 
183. See, e.g., Exodus 21:16 ("Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour."). 
184. See Jennifer C. Bier & David Hibey, False Statements, 34 AM. CruM. L. REv. 567, 572 
(1997) ("Courts disagree on whether § 1001 itself imposes a general duty to be honest and 
forthcoming."). 
185. See Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 37. 
186. See BOK, supra note 4, at 135 ("[L]ies to enemies are traditionally accompanied by a 
special sense of self-evident justification[; they] appeal . . .  to a sense of fairness through 
retribution."). 
187. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966) (noting that interrogation con­
stitutes a phase of the adversary system and that the interrogator does not act in the inter­
rogee's interest); Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 37-38. 
188. See Greenawalt, supra note 133, at 36-37 (citing BoK, supra note 4, at 134-45). 
189. See United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1983) (requiring affirmative 
steps by the government to make suspect aware of duty of truthfulness to the government 
under § 1001 before allowing prosecutions of mere false denials); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 
619 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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fore excuse legal mistakes.19o The exculpatory no exception puts 
this toleration for pristakes of law stemming from moral ambiguity 
into doctrinal form, by excluding mere denials from punishment.191 
In sum, construing section 1001 to include the exculpatory no 
exception reflects the reasonable assumption that Congress legis­
lated with an eye to fairness. Absent indication of congressional 
intent inconsistent with this assumption, the Supreme Court should 
adopt the exception. 
IV. CONTOURS OF THE TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A 
SUSPECT MAY lNvOKE THE EXCULPATORY 
No ExcEPTION 
1bis Part examines the circumstances necessary for a defendant 
to invoke the exculpatory no exception. While courts have used a 
variety of complex tests,192 this Part proposes a simple three-factor 
test that more accurately comports with the purposes of the statute 
and the philosophical justifications of the exception than the multi­
ple factors used by courts in the past. The three factors are as fol­
lows: (i) the false statement must be a mere denial; (ii) the false 
statement must not have perverted the basic functions of the 
agency; and (iii) the suspect must reasonably have believed that a 
truthful answer would have been incriminating. Section IV.A de­
fends the three factors in light of congressional purpose and philo­
sophical justifications. Section N.B rejects, on the same grounds, 
other factors used by various courts. 
A. Conditions Required to Invoke the Exception 
A defendant should be able to invoke the exception only in situ­
ations in which he responds to an agent's incriminating question 
with a simple denial that containing neither aggressive elaboration 
nor discursive falsehood.193 1bis requirement most closely reflects 
the conception of "No" as an exclamatory or performative utter­
ance that is neither true nor false, and, hence, not within the plain 
190. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991) (requiring intent both as to 
elements of crime and existence of duty for tax case, because the proliferation of rules may 
leave the taxpayer ignorant of her noncompliance); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 
426 (1985) (permitting mistake of law defense for violation of statute criminalizing "appar­
ently innocent conduct"); see also United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 
1980) (stating that a mere denial does not give sufficient indication of being knowing and 
willful enough to meet the mens rea requirement of § 1001). 
191. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 142, at 1029-30 (discussing McNally v. United States, 483 
U.S. 350 (1987), which construed a broad federal mail fraud statute narrowly on rule of lenity 
grounds for fear the statute would be applied to conduct that was merely unethical). 
192. See Nicholson, supra note 13, for a circuit-by-circuit analysis. 
193. See United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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language of the false statement statute.194 In addition, a simple de­
nial requirement would be the easiest standard to apply administra­
tively,195 because it does not require distinguishing the degree of 
discursiveness necessary to induce governmental reliance. 
One might argue, of course, that any exculpatory effort, whether 
discursive or nondiscursive, could reflect a self-preserving quest for 
fairness as human dignity. This argument may appear to have par­
ticular force in situations in which, for example, a government agent 
refuses to accept or credit a simple denial and browbeats the inter­
rogee into providing more detail. In fact, however, it also seems 
reasonable to expect that such browbeating would trigger the sus­
pect to ask for the protection of counsel or for permission to leave 
the interview.196 Even if it did not, a discursive exculpatory state­
ment is likely to induce action or reliance on the part of govern­
ment investigators. Such reliance - unlikely in the case of a mere 
denial197 - would arguably significantly pervert the investigator's 
function.198 Because Congress's intent in enacting the false state­
ment statute was to prevent interference with legitimate govern­
ment functions,199 such a statement would more clearly cause the 
harm Congress intended to prevent. Thus, in a procedural propor­
tionality analysis, the difference between a simple denial and a dis­
cursive statement may mark the point at which the government 
interest outweighs the suspect's interest in human dignity.200 
Furthermore, a simple denial seems better evidence that self­
preservation motivated the suspect.201 More elaborate statements, 
on the other hand, suggest premeditated, nefarious and "willful" 
motives such as interference with agency function202 or the deflec-
194. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
195. See Nicholson, supra note 13, at 252-53 (recommending adoption of definition of 
simple denial: "negative responses without any affirmative, aggressive or overt misstate­
ment" (quoting United States v. Paternostro, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
196. See United States v. Thevis, 469 F. Supp. 490, 497-99 (D. Conn. 1979) (reporting that 
after fifty minutes of FBI questioning about various false statements, suspect finally called 
for an attorney). 
197. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
198. See United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1321 (6th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the 
government is not likely to rely on a mere denial of guilt, but very likely would rely on entire 
documents submitted to it). 
199. See supra section I.A: 
200. Cf. United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
exception helped the court "balance the need for protecting the basic functions of govern­
ment agencies with the concern that a criminal suspect not be forced to incriminate himself'). 
201. Cf. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a 
mere "no" does not demonstrate the requisite intent to violate § 1001). 
202. See, e.g., United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 375,384 (D.D.C. 1988) (denying excul­
patory no exception where denials consisted of extensive affirmative falsehoods designed not 
only to avoid self-incrimination, but also to impair the functioning of the congressional com­
mittees to which they were made). 
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tion of blame to an innocent person.203 Such motives are mala in 
se, and the suspect's ignorance of his statutory duty to tell the truth 
would not mitigate his guilt.204 Thus, lack of notice, too, would be 
less likely to be unfair when punishing a discursive lie, as opposed 
to a simple denial. 
The second requirement for invoking the exception permits 
false denials only when they do not actually pervert a basic function 
of a government agency.205 Because perversion of function clearly 
falls within the scope of Congress's intent for the statute,206 fairness 
concerns are less relevant. Courts may not frustrate Congress's 
clear intent by invoking background principles of fairness;201 rather, 
fairness concerns are relevant to statutory constructions that do not 
frustrate congressional intent. 
To satisfy the third requirement for invoking the exception, the 
suspect must demonstrate that he reasonably believed he would 
have incriminated himself had he given a truthful answer to the 
agent's question. The standard should be "reasonable belief' 
rather than "actual danger" because fair play requires that the 
courts minimize the potential for government aouse.208 A suspect 
who reasonably believes himself to be in danger of incriminating 
himself is as likely to be ripe for government overreaching as one is 
aware of an actual danger of self-incrimination. Giving the suspect 
a tool - the false denial - reduces the level of compulsion present 
in noncustodial interrogations so that the suspect is less vulnerable 
in either case. Similarly, without a legal false denial, a suspect com­
promises his human dignity not only when a truthful answer would 
have incriminated him, but also when he believes that the answer 
would have had this effect.209 In either case, it is the belief that he 
203. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1984) (asserting that the valid 
legislative interest served by § 1001 is to protect individuals crime from the "grave conse­
quences" resulting from discursive affirmative falsehoods made by others to government 
investigators). 
204. See Kahan, supra note 176, at 137-44. 
205. See United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988) (distin­
guishing between intrinsic ability to pervert the functions of government and actual ability to 
do so, and requiring the latter). 
· 
206. See, e.g., United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that the circuit had adopted this criterion "cognizant of section lOOl's legislative history and 
Congress's concern over statements that pervert or corrupt agency operations"). 
207. See DwoRKIN, supra note 139, at 16-17. 
208. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text. 
209. See United States v. Payne, 750 F.2d 844, 863 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he 'exculpatory 
no' doctrine requires the reversal of a false statement conviction . . .  if the defendant can 
establish that he or she reasonably believed that truthful affirmative answers would have been 
incriminating." (emphasis added)); but see United States v. Grotke, 702 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (rejecting reasonable belief standard and requiring actual incrimination). 
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is participating in his own destruction that constitutes the spectacle 
of unfairness and cruelty.210 
B. Conditions Not Required to Invoke the Exception 
In addition to the factors mentioned in section IV.A, courts 
have considered additional factors. This section argues that three 
of these factors should not be part of the test for invoking the ex­
ception because they do not lend themselves to administrative sim­
plicity, let alone comport with congressional intent or the 
exception's philosophical underpinnings. These three requirements 
are: (i) that the statement be unrelated to a claim or privilege;211 
(ii) that the defendant have been a suspect in the investigation dur­
ing which he delivers the false exculpatory denial;212 and (iii) that 
the interrogee have issued the false denial in the course of an inves­
tigation, rather than during a routine administrative matter.213 
The first requirement simply bears no sufficient relation to Con­
gress's intent to prohibit statements that pervert the functioning of 
the government. Under this requirement a defendant who issued 
an exculpatory denial while seeking, for example, a government ap­
pointment, entry into the United States, or a government contract, 
would not be eligible for the exception.214 While a "claim" or 
"privilege" does suggest that important government functions are at 
stake, the requirement is both under- and overinclusive. A suspect 
may be making a claim yet may not pervert agency functions; on the 
other hand, the suspect may not be making a claim but still inter­
fere with the functioning of government.21s 
210. Cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 {1980) (holding that in defining whether 
questioning is interrogation, courts should "focus[ ]  primarily upon the perceptions of the 
suspect, rather than the intent of the police"). 
211. See, e.g., Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 544. 
212. See United States v. Alzate-Restreppo, 890 F.2d 1061, 1067 {9th Cir. 1989) (requir­
ing, apparently, that the defendant have been suspected of a crime or undergoing custodial 
interrogation to take advantage of exception). 
213. See, e.g., Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d at 544-45. 
214. See, e.g., United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 647 {3d Cir. 1992) (prosecuting false 
denial where a defendant sought a job with the federal government); United States v. Rose, 
570 F.2d 1358, 1364 {9th Cir. 1978) (prosecuting false denial where a defendant sought claim 
of entry to the United States); United States v. Raether, 940 F. Supp. 1485 (D.S.D. 1996) 
(prosecuting false statement given by a company official seeking to acquire cheaply excess 
federal property). 
215. Furthermore, this requirement has proven difficult to administer; courts have inter­
preted identical factual scenarios in opposite ways. Compare, e.g., United States v. Olsowy, 
836 F.2d 439, 441 {9th Cir. 1987) (defendant's fraudulent attempt to obtain a replacement 
U.S. Treasury check for one he had already received and cashed characterized as a claim 
against the government) with United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 184 (4th Cir. 1988) 
{defendant's fraudulent attempt to obtain replacement U.S. Treasury check for one she had 
already received and cashed not characterized as claim against the government). 
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Enforcing the second requirement would inadequately protect 
fairness. It may exclude from protection nonsuspects to whom in­
criminating questions are posed.216 There is no reason to think that 
nonsuspects would be invulnerable to the same kinds of unfairness; 
after all, the government can put even a nonsuspect into a position 
where he can incriminate himself.217 In fact, one circuit restricts the 
exception to those who are unaware of being a suspect, reasoning 
that a nonsuspect is more vulnerable because his silence might alert 
the investigator to his guilt.218 Accordingly, to protect fairness ade­
quately, both suspects and nonsuspects ought to be able to invoke 
the exception. 
The third requirement, that the suspect have issued the false de­
nial in the course of an investigation - as opposed to during a rou­
tine administrative matter - is duplicative: a belief in the potential 
for self-incrimination usually only arises in the course of an investi­
gation.219 It has been argued that this distinction separates the po­
tentially unfair investigatory situation entailing possible criminal 
sanctions,220 from the presumably fair administrative situation, that 
has no such consequences.221 In practice, however, courts have not 
uniformly applied the distinction,222 and the Eleventh Circuit has 
deemed it unworkable.223 Thus, the inquiry as to whether a truthful 
response would have been incriminating, a test that does not entail 
these complications, better captures the intent of the distinction. 
216. See United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 716 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving criminal 
investigation of third party during which investigators posed incriminating questions to inter­
rogee, even though they already knew the answers). 
217. On the other hand, nonsuspects might be more likely to induce governmental reli­
ance on the truthfulness of the statement because the agent would have no reason to doubt 
its authenticity. See Schwartz, supra note 149, at 328. A greater likelihood of reliance may 
create the interference with government functions Congress intended the statute to prevent. 
On balance, however, whether an interrogee is classified as a suspect or nonsuspect, agents 
ought to expect that people will avoid opportunities to incriminate themselves. For this rea­
son, investigators ought to treat a denial of involvement in criminal activity like any self­
serving statement: potentially true, but biased and requiring confirmation. See supra note 
49-53 and accompanying text. 
218. See United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1980). 
219. Cf. United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1320 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that the two 
requirements are based on the same Fifth Amendment rationale). 
220. See Gerstein, supra note 119, at 354 ("While the moral autonomy of the individual is 
compromised whenever the state compels an admission of wrongdoing, the wrong is clearest 
and gravest when the state compels the admission as part of the process by which it seeks to 
establish a defendant's guilt in a legally definitive manner."). 
221. See United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled by United 
States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994). 
222. See Nicholson, supra note 13, at 254-55. 
223. See United States v. Payne, 750 F.2d 844, 863 n.21 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Second and Fifth Circuits adduced two main reasons for 
rejecting the exculpatory no exception to the federal false state­
ment statute approximately forty years after the exception was :first 
adopted. First, the courts argued that the plain language of the stat­
ute provided no explicit authorization for the exception. As this 
Note has demonstrated, the plain language is rife with ambiguity, 
the courts recognize other judicial glosses that have no explicit au­
thorization, and the legislative history shows no congressional in­
tent to criminalize mere exculpatory denials. These facts refute the 
courts' Plain Language Objection. 
Second, the courts ruled that the Fifth Amendment constituted 
no bar to applying section 1001 to mere exculpatory denials. After 
sketching the possible constitutional violation this application 
presents, this Note has argued that adopting the exculpatory no 
construction permits the Court to avoid unnecessarily resolving this 
constitutional question. The exculpatory no exception also protects 
background concepts of fairness inherent in the Constitution and 
especially the Fifth Amendment. These two factors refute the val­
ues objection. 
The refutation of these two objections, combined with the fact 
that the exception is consistent with the statutory purpose of section 
1001 counsels for Supreme Court adoption of the exception. This 
adoption should include the test that this Note has suggested for 
whether a defendant may invoke the exception. Thus, only a simple 
denial that causes no perversion of government functions in re­
sponse to an incriminating question ought to be deemed an excul­
patory no. 
